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AUGUST 19, 2010

by David Cole
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project
a case decided by the Supreme Court, June 24, 2010

On January 21, in its first decision of its recent term, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the
Supreme Court’s five-member conservative majority announced that the First Amendment bars Congress
from restricting the ways corporations can employ their vast financial resources to drown out the voices of
ordinary people in federal election campaigns. On June 21, in one of its last decisions of the term, Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, the same majority, this time joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, ruled that the
First Amendment permits Congress to imprison human rights activists for up to fifteen years merely for
advising militant organizations on ways to reject violence and pursue their disputes through lawful means.
The two decisions purported to apply the same First Amendment standard, but in fact the Court applied that
standard in radically different ways. In the Roberts Court’s world, corporations’ freedom to spend unlimited
sums of money apparently deserves substantially greater protection than the freedom of human rights
advocates to speak.
Ronald Dworkin has cogently identified the errors1 in the Court’s legal reasoning in Citizens United, a
decision President Obama himself has criticized. But you won’t see the President condemning the decision
in Humanitarian Law Project, the first Supreme Court case to pit free speech rights against national security
since the September 11 attacks. At issue was a federal law banning “material support” to “foreign terrorist
organizations” even when the “support” consists only of speech advocating peace and human rights. The
lower courts had repeatedly declared the provisions that prohibit speech unconstitutional, but the Obama
administration—represented by Elena Kagan, the solicitor general—appealed to the Supreme Court, to which
she was later nominated. (I argued the case for the Humanitarian Law Project, an organization that works to
promote human rights and peace in conflict-ridden regions.)
The material support law, enacted as part of the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and
expanded by the 2001 Patriot Act, gives the secretary of state virtually unchecked authority to formulate a list
of “foreign terrorist organizations.” The list currently includes, among others, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party of Turkey. It is a crime to provide “material support” to listed groups, not only in
the form of money or weapons, but also in the form of speech; the law specifically prohibits anyone from
providing them with “expert advice,” “training,” and “services.” According to the Obama administration the
law prohibits even speech that seeks to discourage violence by encouraging lawful alternatives.
Under this law, when former President Jimmy Carter monitored the June 2009 elections in Lebanon, and met
with each of the parties to advise them on fair election practices, he could have been prosecuted for providing
“material support,” in the form of “expert advice,” to a designated group, because he advised Hezbollah.
When The New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and The Washington Post published Op-Eds by Hamas
leaders in recent years, they, too, were committing the crime of providing “material support” to a designated
terrorist group, because doing so provided Hamas a “service.” And my clients, a retired judge and a human
rights group, cannot continue to work with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party for peace and human rights on
behalf of the Kurds in Turkey, as they had been doing before the law took effect, without risking long prison
terms.
In the past, the Supreme Court has ruled that the First Amendment protected the right to advocate even
criminal activity, including overthrow of the government, so long as one’s advocacy was not intended and
likely to produce an imminent crime. In the Humanitarian Law Project case, however, the Court ruled—for
the first time in its history—that speech advocating only lawful, nonviolent activity can be subject to criminal
penalty.
The Court’s decision is all the more disturbing when contrasted with Citizens United. The campaign finance
law that the Court struck down did not prohibit speech, but merely required corporations to establish
political action committees, using separate funds, to engage in political campaign speech. The campaign
finance law applied across the board to all corporations and unions, without regard to political identity, and
afforded public officials no discretion to pick and choose. The material support law, by contrast, criminalizes
speech outright—consulting with, advising, or speaking on behalf of disfavored groups. And it gives the
executive branch carte blanche to apply the ban only to those organizations it disfavors, thereby greatly
amplifying the risk of censorship.
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The Supreme Court found that both laws restrict speech based on its content, and therefore had to undergo
the Court’s most demanding standard of review, known as “strict scrutiny.” Under strict scrutiny, laws can be
sustained only if they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The late Stanford law
professor Gerald Gunther once described this standard as “strict in theory, but fatal in fact,” because so few
laws have ever survived it. The standard reflects the First Amendment’s strong presumption against
content-based regulations of speech, and is supposed to ensure that the justices’ own sympathies for
particular speech or speakers do not affect their constitutional analysis.
In both cases, there was no dispute that the government had a legitimate goal; the question was whether the
means chosen were narrowly tailored. Thus, in Humanitarian Law Project the Court asked whether barring
peaceful communication with listed groups intended only to further non- violent ends was necessary to
protect our national security. In Citizens United, the question was whether requiring corporations to use
segregated funds for campaign spending was narrowly tailored to guard against corruption of the political
process.
In Citizens United, the Court imposed a heavy burden of justification on the government, and required solid
evidentiary support for all justifications that the government offered. For example, the Court rejected as
insufficiently supported by evidence the government’s argument that unrestricted corporate expenditures
could lead to corruption of politicians, despite extensive congressional findings and evidence documenting
precisely such corruption.
By contrast, in Humanitarian Law Project, the Court upheld the material support law based on justifications
that were unsupported by evidence—and in some instances were not even advanced by the government. The
Court reasoned that speech advocating peace and human rights might “legitimate” a designated terrorist
group, thereby interfering with US foreign policy. And even though neither Congress nor the administration
ever suggested as much, Chief Justice Roberts speculated that advising an organization on how to file human
rights complaints with the United Nations might permit the group to use the law to “threaten, manipulate, and
disrupt,” and that helping a group pursue peace might give it cover to prepare for its next attack.
The Court demanded no evidence that any of these hypothetical dangers had ever come to pass. Instead, the
Court explained that, because the material support statute’s goals were “preventive,” no evidentiary support
was required. But of course, the campaign finance law was equally preventive, since it sought to forestall
corruption and distortion of the political process. Indeed, virtually all laws restricting speech are
“preventive,” inasmuch as they seek to avoid future harm.
Moreover, in permitting the government to suppress speech on the ground that it might make people think
better of designated groups, the Court endorsed a “viewpoint-based” rationale directly antithetical to the
First Amendment. The Court has in the past reserved its most skeptical review for “viewpoint-based” laws,
which prohibit speech on one side of a particular issue, but not the other. In fact, until Humanitarian Law
Project, no viewpoint-based law had ever survived Supreme Court review. The administration’s claim that it
can bar speech because it might “legitimate” an organization is, by definition, “viewpoint-based”: it prohibits
speech because it sends a message—that a group is “legitimate”—of which the executive disapproves. Yet
Chief Justice Roberts never even addressed this critique.
Attempting to portray his decision as restrained, Roberts stressed that it addressed only speech “coordinated”
with foreign organizations engaged in terrorism, not independent advocacy or speech coordinated with
domestic groups. (By “coordinated,” he seemed to mean speech that involves some kind of direct contact
with the group in question.) But as Justice Stephen Breyer noted in dissent, independent advocacy is if
anything more likely to confer “legitimacy” on a designated group, so if independent advocacy cannot be
prohibited on that ground, why can coordinated speech be suppressed? Coordinated speech is just as
protected as independent speech; the right to speak necessarily implies the right to speak with and to others.
Nor is Roberts’s emphasis on the foreign identity of the designated groups convincing, particularly in our
increasingly interconnected world. An American writing for the London Guardian is no less protected from
US criminal prosecution for his articles than one writing for The New York Times.
As to the use of violence by the groups in question, the Court has previously upheld the right of US citizens
to speak and associate with the Communist Party as long as they intended to further only lawful ends—even
though Congress formally found that the Communist Party was an international conspiracy that used
terrorism and other violent means to seek the overthrow of the United States by force and violence. At oral
argument, Justice Antonin Scalia said the Communist Party was different because people associated with it
for “philosophical” reasons, a rationale a conservative of his stripe would have scoffed at during the
McCarthy era itself. In any event, surely the First Amendment protects those who speak out of a commitment
to human rights and peace no differently than those who speak from philosophical motives. Chief Justice
Roberts maintained that decisions in the Communist Party cases were different because they protected
association and assembly, not “material support.” But when “material support” consists of the mere act of
speaking with or to a group, there is nothing left of the rights to associate and assemble.
In short, while the Court ostensibly applied the same stringent standard of review in both Citizens United
and Humanitarian Law Project, in the latter case it accepted arguments that would never have satisfied the
demanding test it employed in Citizens United. Once the administration invoked national security and the
war on terror, the Court abandoned its obligation to protect speech. History shows that it is in moments of
great fear that governments are most likely to target speech and association. The same history also shows that
such overreaching not only compromises the fundamental freedoms that undergird our democracy, but is
likely to backfire, by targeting innocents and breeding resentment. At its best, constitutional law reflects the
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lessons of history and saves us from repeating our mistakes. Modern First Amendment doctrine in particular
was formulated in response to the excesses of the McCarthy era. But when the Court allows unsupported
speculation about “terrorism” and disapproval of a speaker’s viewpoint to justify making advocacy of human
rights a crime, we appear to be repeating history rather than learning from it.
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